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Updating the Crowdfunding Narrative
Summary
Policymakers concerned about stimulating small business and entrepreneurial growth need to better
understand the dynamics of crowdfunding as a vehicle for that growth. The conventional wisdom is that
raising cash through crowdfunding always benefits entrepreneurs. But that is not the complete picture. In
reality, there are ways in which entrepreneurs, as well as VCs looking for new investments, may actually be left
worse off after a successful crowdfunding campaign. This issue brief examines the potential pitfalls of a
successful campaign. These include a moral hazard problem that comes into play when entrepreneurs explore
both crowdfunding and venture capital investment, which can lead to a breakdown in negotiations between
entrepreneurs and VCs, leaving the VC without a potentially lucrative project and the entrepreneur without
the VC’s essential financial support, expertise, and guidance. While the brief focuses on reward-based
crowdfunding platforms, the pitfalls described herein likely apply as well to peer-to-peer lending, real estate,
and equity-crowdfunding platforms too.
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Updating the Crowdfunding 
Narrative
Volodymyr Babich, PhD; Simone Marinesi, PhD; Gerry Tsoukalas, PhD
As the 2020 election cycle progresses, presidential and congressional 
candidates will soon be debating their plans for stimulating small business and 
entrepreneurial growth.
In 2019, an important channel of that growth is 
crowdfunding. Although this is not the first election 
cycle since the advent of crowdfunding, this relatively 
new means for raising entrepreneurial capital has 
matured to the point that policymakers should more 
thoroughly understand its benefits and downsides in 
order to make or support better policy. Unfortunately, 
the current narrative around crowdfunding fails to take 
into account the full picture.
The general intuition and conventional wisdom 
around crowdfunding holds that raising cash is always 
good for entrepreneurs, just as establishing signals of 
market demand is always good for both entrepreneurs 
and the venture capitalists (VCs) looking to invest 
their money prudently. But this logic is incomplete. It 
does not consider the interactions between entrepre-
neurs and the suppliers of financing. In reality, both 
entrepreneurs and VCs may actually be worse off after 
a successful crowdfunding campaign. The cash raised 
and the observable increase in the probability that a 
crowdfunded project will be successful collectively alter 
not only the competition between investor classes (e.g., 
VCs and banks), but also the incentives of entre-
preneurs and VCs to exert effort—a so-called moral 
hazard problem. The bottom line is that entrepreneurs 
SUMMARY
• Policymakers concerned about stimulating small business and 
entrepreneurial growth need to better understand the dynamics 
of crowdfunding as a vehicle for that growth.
• The conventional wisdom is that raising cash through crowdfund-
ing always benefits entrepreneurs. But that is not the complete 
picture. In reality, there are ways in which entrepreneurs, as 
well as VCs looking for new investments, may actually be left 
worse off after a successful crowdfunding campaign.
• This issue brief examines the potential pitfalls of a successful 
campaign. These include a moral hazard problem that comes 
into play when entrepreneurs explore both crowdfunding and 
venture capital investment, which can lead to a breakdown in 
negotiations between entrepreneurs and VCs, leaving the VC 
without a potentially lucrative project and the entrepreneur 
without the VC’s essential financial support, expertise, and 
guidance.
• While the brief focuses on reward-based crowdfunding platforms, 
the pitfalls described herein likely apply as well to peer-to-peer 
lending, real estate, and equity-crowdfunding platforms too.
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should not ignore the broader conse-
quences that crowdfunding can have 
on outside financing sources because 
the possibility exists that crowdfunders 
could leave economic value and 
future innovation on the negotiating 
table, if VCs, as potential sources of 
operational expertise, walk away after 
a successful campaign. Empirically, 
we know this happens, and there are 
several reasons for it.
In this Issue Brief, we discuss the 
full benefits and costs of crowdfunding 
to entrepreneurs and venture capitalist 
investors.1  It behooves policymakers 
to understand the dynamics of this 
burgeoning part of the U.S. economy, 
especially as crowdfunding develops to 
include newer technologies and types 
of rewards (e.g., equity) for investors.2  
THE PITFALLS OF A 
SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN
Crowdfunding alone typically 
does not raise all the capital that 
entrepreneurs need. In 2015, crowd-
funded efforts raised $2.7 billion, 
which pales in comparison to VC and 
bank investments—$58.8 and $240 
billion, respectively—made that same 
year.3  But it is widely acknowledged 
that capital is only one of two key 
benefits of crowdfunding, with the 
other being information in the form of 
demand signaling. Entrepreneurs use 
crowdfunding as a public indicator of 
market demand. VCs and banks can 
evaluate this information to determine 
project-payoff probability (PPP). For 
successful projects, public information 
can open up access to financing that 
would otherwise be unavailable, and it 
can improve an entrepreneur’s options 
when VCs and banks compete over 
financing. 
The visible success or failure of a 
crowdfunding campaign can be a very 
beneficial feature. Consider Oculus 
Rift, the virtual reality visor launched 
on Kickstarter in 2012. The firm raised 
$2.4 million through crowdfunding, 
almost 10 times its original target. 
This success generated a lot of inter-
est and culminated in a sizable $75 
million investment from Andreessen 
Horowitz VC. In this case, the com-
bination of crowdfunding success and 
VC involvement turned this startup, 
seeking to raise $250,000 in 2012, 
into a $2 billion company acquired by 
Facebook just two years later, provid-
ing VCs with a handsome payoff on 
their investment. Oculus Rift is just 
one of many examples that highlight 
the complementarity of crowdfunding 
to other forms of early stage financing. 
But there are drawbacks to such 
freely available information. If a proj-
ect raises too much capital or a PPP is 
deemed to be too high, the incentives 
for VCs to invest at all—or to exert 
project-improving operational effort 
if they do invest—may be reduced, 
potentially undermining negotiations 
with entrepreneurs. VCs prefer to 
invest early in order to capture a larger 
share of future profits, so a significant 
crowdfunding capital raise may make 
an otherwise attractive venture unap-
pealing, especially if an entrepreneur 
were to use the crowdfunded capital as 
the basis for making demands of VCs 
that they would not otherwise make.
Recent empirical evidence based 
on almost 200 successful Kickstarter 
campaigns suggests that crowdfunded 
projects still may lose out on subse-
quent financing, for numerous rea-
sons.4  When VCs anticipate having 
to compete with other investors after a 
campaign, they may choose to increase 
their contributions before a campaign, 
so as to induce the entrepreneur to 
forgo crowdfunding. For example, the 
company 612Games was set to launch 
a $250,000 campaign on Kickstarter 
in 2017, but it received additional 
funds from its current investors and 
canceled crowdfunding plans.5  
Another potential drawback for 
entrepreneurs is that greater interest in 
1  This Issue Brief is primarily based on the following paper: 
Volodymyr Babich, Simone Marinesi, and Gerry Tsoukalas 
(2019), “Does crowdfunding benefit entrepreneurs and 
venture capital investors?” M&SOM (forthcoming). Our 
main focus is reward-based crowdfunding, which is the 
most popular type.
2  Equity crowdfunding is still a nascent form of entrepreneur-
ial financing that will need to be studied over the coming 
years.
3  Massolution.com Crowdfunding Industry Report, 2015.
4  See, e.g., Ryu, S. & K. Kim (2017), “The effect of crowd-
funding success on subsequent financing and exit out-
comes of start-ups,” Working Paper; and Colombo, M.G. & 
K. Shafi (2016), “When does reward-based crowdfunding 
help firms obtain external financing?” Working Paper. 
5  Donnelly, J. (2017), “Wild west online gets funding, will 
sidestep kickstarter and include female characters from 
outset,” PC Gamer. Available at https://www.pcgamer.
com/wild-west-online-receives-funding-will-sidestep-
kickstarter-and-include-female-characters-from-outset/.
6  Empirical support for this argument provided in Hellmann, 
T. & M. Puri (2002), “Venture capital and the profession-
alization of start-up firms: Empirical evidence,” J. of Fin. 
L. VII(1); and Aggarwal, R., D. Kryscynski, and H. Singh 
(2015), “Evaluating venture technical competence in 
venture capitalist investment decisions,” Man. Sci. 61(11) 
2685–2706. 
7  Teten, D. (2013), “Strategies for VCs to increase startup 
success odds,” Techcrunch.com. Available at https://tech-
crunch.com/2013/03/30/the-lower-risk-startup-how-ven-
ture-capitalists-increase-the-odds- of-startup-success/.
8  Supra note 4.
9  We treat bank investors and VC investors differently. Regu-
NOTES
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their project from banks is sometimes 
enough to make VCs walk away from 
investing altogether, if the competition 
with banks erodes the share of future 
profits that a VC firm seeks to secure. 
Although at first this sounds like a 
good problem for the entrepreneur 
to have, there are many businesses or 
products that need the other benefits 
offered by traditional VC investors 
much more than they need additional 
cash. For example, VCs can lever-
age existing connections with trusted 
supply chain partners to lower risk, 
facilitate the procurement of parts, 
reduce the need for costly monitor-
ing, and shorten time to market. They 
can also offer management skills and 
experience.6  This operational expertise 
is especially important for first-time 
entrepreneurs and for those under-
taking complex projects relying on 
navigating global supply chain net-
works and subcontractor relationships 
in countries like China. Any of these 
functions may be more valuable to 
entrepreneurs than extra capital,7  so 
they must be aware of what they actu-
ally stand to lose by embarking upon a 
crowdfunding campaign or by pitting 
investors against each other after a 
successful crowdfunding campaign.
INJECTING MORAL HAZARD 
INTO THE NARRATIVE
The majority of published crowd-
funding studies focus on predicting 
campaign outcomes and on opti-
mal campaign design. However, the 
broader questions of how crowdfund-
ing alters entrepreneurs’ financing 
preferences and how crowdfunding 
platforms fit in with the traditional 
startup financing sources, such as 
banks and VCs, have received rela-
tively little attention. Our work dem-
onstrates that entrepreneurial objec-
tives can be more complex than simply 
designing campaigns to maximize pay-
offs—an implicit assumption that the 
majority of existing research makes. 
In reality, there seems to be a tradeoff 
between crowdfunding benefits and 
VC operational financing benefits for 
some projects. 
To explore these trade-offs rigor-
ously and identify projects where 
they apply, we modeled the interac-
tions between crowdfunders, banks, 
and venture capital investors, in a 
multi-period setting, with competi-
tion between investor classes. This is 
the first attempt to understand the full 
crowdfunding picture theoretically and 
to support the empirical findings that 
negotiations between entrepreneurs 
and VCs sometimes break down after 
successful campaigns.8  
The main takeaway from our 
research is that there is a systemic 
moral hazard problem at play when 
entrepreneurs explore both crowd-
funding and venture capital invest-
ment. Our model actually features a 
double-sided moral hazard dynamic, 
in that both the entrepreneur and the 
VC can exert operational effort to 
improve the outcome of the project, 
but because such effort is non-observ-
able and non-contractible, both parties 
may be disinclined to expend the req-
uisite effort on the heels of a successful 
crowdfunding campaign.9  
Moral hazard is a recurrent 
problem in operations management. 
It can hurt the performance of a firm 
in many ways, and it the missing piece 
of the current crowdfunding narra-
tive. We model moral hazard by giving 
each party the choice of how much 
effort to exert. In our framework, the 
generic term “effort” is intentionally 
non-specific, in order to capture a 
broad spectrum of non-contractible 
operational decisions that startup 
firms need to make. Similarly, for the 
VC, effort can be a proxy for the oper-
ational expertise it can decide to bring 
to the table. In both cases, such actions 
lead to moral hazard because they 
lar bank investors simply provide capital and are in perfect 
competition with each other. However, VCs provide more 
than just capital, as noted previously. 
10 Iancu, D., N. Trichakis, and G. Tsoukalas (2016), “Is op-
erating flexibility harmful under debt?” Man. Sci. 63(6), 
1730–1761.
NOTES 
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usually cannot be contracted upon, as 
operational effort is not observable 
without costly monitoring.10 
Our results raise an obvious 
question: Can entrepreneurs avoid 
the adverse consequences of success-
ful crowdfunding by simply forego-
ing crowdfunding whenever it will 
be to their detriment? The answer 
requires solving a multi-stage game 
and comparing the equilibrium of 
this game with that in a hypotheti-
cal economy without crowdfunding. 
In short, it is extremely difficult to 
know in real time. It is likely impos-
sible to eliminate all of the adverse 
effects of crowdfunding, particularly 
those resulting from the ongoing 
interactions between crowdfunders 
and banks. The fact that crowdfund-
ing has the ability to intensify bank 
competition in the future can cause 
the initial negotiation with VCs to 
fail in the present, leaving both parties 
worse off—the VC without a project 
and the entrepreneur without the VC’s 
expertise. 
A SUMMARY OF THE PROS 
AND CONS OF A SUCCESSFUL 
CAMPAIGN 
Crowdfunding is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, but the interest in this 
addition to early-seed entrepreneurial 
financing has been remarkable. In the 
U.S. alone, over $3 billion has so far 
flowed from backers to entrepreneurs, 
and success stories like that of Ocu-
lus Rift have only strengthened the 
narrative that crowdfunding presents 
new opportunities for startups. While 
our results support this narrative, they 
uncover a far more nuanced story, and 
one that is particularly relevant for 
successfully-crowdfunded projects. 
What should not be lost in this 
discussion is the reality that crowd-
funding can increase project value, as 
well as alleviate the classical under-
investment problem due to moral 
hazard frictions. Crowdfunding may 
also foster competition between inves-
tors, benefiting the entrepreneur. All 
of these are positive developments. 
But the aim of this Issue Brief is to 
fill in the gaps of the current narrative. 
Namely, when crowdfunding leads 
to large enough changes in capital 
requirements, or when it increases the 
success probability of a project too 
significantly, it may undermine the 
incentives of entrepreneurs or VCs to 
provide operational effort, and this can 
(and does, observably) lead nego-
tiations to break down. In addition, 
because crowdfunding may increase 
competition between banks and VCs, 
thereby reducing returns to VC inves-
tors, VCs may choose to drop out. 
When this happens, the entrepreneur 
can be worse off because they lose out 
on the expertise that VCs could have 
added to the project. These effects also 
operate across time. Notably, the threat 
of future bank competition (enabled 
by crowdfunding) could change the 
negotiation between entrepreneurs 
and VCs at earlier stages. 
Beyond reward-based platforms, 
which are the object of our study, 
crowdfunding has expanded into many 
different directions in the last few 
years, including peer-to-peer lending, 
real estate, and equity-crowdfunding 
platforms. To the extent that all of 
these platforms can provide cash 
to entrepreneurs, but also valuable 
information to both entrepreneurs and 
investors, we expect our results, which 
are essentially driven by double-sided 
moral hazard and competition among 
investor classes, to apply more gen-
erally. This is the complete picture 
of crowdfunding that policymakers 
should have in mind, if they are deter-
mined to help small enterprises and 
entrepreneurs thrive.
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